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 Why the McCarran- Walter
 Act Must Be Amended
 JOHN A. SCANLAN
 our society, founded on the princi-
 ple of free debate about important public
 issues, cease the practice of excluding
 aliens because of their beliefs, their
 political utterances, or their party affilia-
 tions? Should the academy, which has long been
 particularly affected by the ideological provisions of
 United States immigration law, take an active role
 in seeking to repeal or liberalize these provisions?
 These are the questions presented, not for the first
 time, by current efforts in the House of Represen-
 tatives (H.R. 1119, introduced by Representative
 Barney Frank [D-MA] to repeal the ideological pro-
 visions of the McCarran-Walter Act. Both questions
 should be answered affirmatively, for reasons
 grounded not only in concerns about the effects of
 present law on academic freedom, but also on the
 lessons the academy should learn from its past.
 Few would contend that current governmental
 attempts to control what is researched or taught in
 American colleges and universities approach the
 level or reflect the virulence so characteristic of the
 late 1940s and early 1950s, when Cold-War hysteria
 was at its height. Although official attacks on in-
 dividual professors identified as Marxist or
 "radical" do occur (and may in fact be increasing
 in frequency), no contemporary analogue exists for
 the concerted attempt to purge institutions of
 higher education of "Red-ucators" and "fellow
 travellers" that was promoted by Congress and
 many state legislatures and embraced with such
 vigor by so many university administrators and
 boards of trustees during the McCarthy era. Like
 their counterparts of that era, organizations such as
 "Accuracy in Academia" apparently are motivated
 by the desire to impose a conservative orthodoxy
 on every branch of learning. To date, however,
 their efforts have met with more ridicule than
 support.
 Although "Olliemania" may shift the balance
 slightly, a national consensus appears to have
 emerged slowly over the last quarter-century that
 the threat to United States security interests posed
 by Communist movements abroad is manageable
 and ought not to be combatted internally by
 "witch hunts" that pose their own immediate
 threats to American freedom. Congress has largely
 concurred, as have the courts. Since the early
 1960s, standing "investigating committees" have
 been disbanded at the national and state levels, the
 First Amendment rights of academics have been af-
 firmed in a variety of legal contexts, and "loyalty
 oaths" have been almost totally abolished.
 We must not minimize the importance of these
 changes; but we must be careful not to exaggerate
 them. Particularly during the Reagan years, "na-
 tional security" has been offered as a talismanic
 justif cation for a wide variety of governmental
 practices impinging directly on the academy. In its
 name, barriers have been imposed on American
 scholars seeking to conduct research in Cuba, ac-
 cess has been restricted to documents formerly
 available from government agencies, and attempts
 have been made to deny foreign scholars access to
"sensitive"- but hardly secret or classified- infor-
 mation and technology. More important, perhaps,
 "national security" grounds have been used to in-
 voke the ong-standing power of the federal gov-
 ernment to bar or expel aliens whose views the
 present administration considers dangerous, either
 because they advocate the "economic, interna-
 tional, and governmental doctrines of world com-
 munism," are present or former members of Marx-
 ist or socialist political parties, or threaten through
 their writings and their speech "to engage in ac-
 tivities which would be prejudicial to the public in-
 terest." Most of the aliens affected by the exercise
 of this power have been foreign academics, jour-
 nalists, creative writers, or public officials who
 have been invited to teach or lecture at American
 universities or professional symposia.
 use of immigration law to stifle dissent
 and attempt to hold unpopular ideas at bay
 is nearly as old as this nation. However, the
 explicit nexus between national attitudes toward
 foreigners, "alien ideologies," and limited aca-
 demic freedom was not forged until after the Rus-
 sian Revolution, two world wars, and the emer-
 gence of the United States as a "world power."
 In 1798, when Congress enacted the infamous
 Alien and Sedition Acts, it made specific provision
 for deporting "alien enemies" (the Alien Enemy
 Act) and other aliens whom the president con-
 sidered "dangerous to the peace and safety of the
 United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to
 suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret
 machinations against the government thereof" (the
 Aliens Act).1 Two years later, responding to
 widespread popular opposition, Congress permit-
 ted the little-used Aliens Act to lapse. Most of the
 John A. Scanlan is associate professor of law at Indiana
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 sent and attempt to hold unpopular ideas
 at bay is nearly as old as this nation. "
 opposition resulted from revulsion about how the
 related Sedition Acts were employed by the Feder-
 alist party against its domestic political enemies. In
 an important but seldom quoted dissent written in
 1961, Justice Hugo Black noted:
 [t]he enforcement of these statutes . . . constitutes one
 of the greatest blots on our country's record of free-
 dom. Publishers were sent to jail for writing their own
 views and for publishing the views of others. The
 slightest criticism of Government or policies of govern-
 ment officials was enough to cause biased federal
 prosecutors to put the machinery of Government to
 work to crush and imprison the critic. Rumors which
 filled the air pointed the finger of suspicion at good
 men and bad men alike, sometimes causing the social
 ostracism of people who loved their country with a
 deathless devotion. Members of the Jeffersonian Party
 were picked out as special targets so that they could
 be illustrious examples of what could happen to peo-
 ple who failed to sing paeans of praise for current
 federal officials and their policies.2
 However, the Alien Enemy Act- which had not
 been invoked during that turbulent era- was never
 repealed. Nearly two hundred years after its pas-
 sage, it continues to provide authorization for
 removing "natives, citizens, and subjects" of coun-
 tries in a "state of declared war" against the
 United States.
 Slightly more than a century later, the Congress,
 reacting to the assassination of President William
 McKinley, enacted permanent legislation making
 simple advocacy of, or belief in, "the overthrow by
 force or violence of the United States or of all gov-
 ernments or of all forms of law" a ground for ex-
 cluding an intending immigrant from the United
 States. This attack on "anarchism" clearly was
 responsive to a single act of unusual violence; yet
 it also reflected broader national concerns about
 "radicals" in the labor movement (and the "radi-
 cal" demands for representation, higher wages,
 and better working conditions that the embattled
 unions were making), and a growing belief that
 the "new immigrants" from Eastern and Central
 Europe brought with them political values that
 threatened the existing social and political status
 quo. Advocacy and belief were thus put on the
 same moral plane as a demonstrated intent to
 assassinate political officials.
 During and immediately following the First
 World War, additional legislation was adopted ex-
 panding the class of excludable aliens to include
 those advocating or teaching unlawful destruction
 ■^■■■■■■■■IMM^MHHiMI
 of property, and the first statute providing for the
 deportation of subversives since 1798 was enacted
 to permit the expulsion of aliens believed to favor
 such destruction, or to be "anarchists, or. . .who
 believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or
 violence of the government of the United
 States, ... or who disbelieve in or are opposed to
 organized government, or who teach the duty,
 necessity, or propriety of the unlawful killing of
 any officer. . .of the government of the United
 States or of any other organized government
 Another statute made deportable "aliens who
 wrote, published, circulated, or possessed subver-
 sive literature."3 The primary targets of this legisla-
 tion were still anarchists, although implicit recogni-
 tion was also given to the dangers to the United
 States believed posed by Communist
 revolutionaries.
 Yet the bulk of the American electorate in 1917
 and 1918 was probably more concerned about the
 dangers posed by "alien enemies" (i.e., German
 nationals)- and anyone believed insufficiently
 patriotic or unduly supportive of the German cause
 or a premature peace. Those concerns were shared
 by a significant nurhber of American college ad-
 ministrators. For the first time, nativist and chau-
 vinist sentiment was translated directly into a
 major attack on academic freedom. Symbolically
 led by Columbia University President Nicholas
 Murray Butler (who, according to Richard
 Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, "formally
 withdrew the privilege of academic freedom for the
 duration of the war"4), universities across the na-
 tion began imposing "loyalty oaths," censuring
 pro-German or pacifist sentiments, and firing pro-
 fessors who overstepped the ill-defined line of
 compelled political conformity. Although Harvard
 faced down a donor threatening to cancel a
 $10,000,000 bequest unless the university demoted
 an openly pro-German professor5 and other institu-
 tions resisted pressures brought by public opinion,
 financial contributors, and angry trustees, the pro-
 fession generally paid more heed to concerns about
 patriotism than it did to issues of academic
 freedom. The AAUP Committee on Academic
 Freedom in Wartime concluded, among other
 things, that professors of Germanic origin or sym-
 pathy were obligated "to refrain from public
 discussion of the war; and in their private inter-
 course with neighbors, colleagues, and students, to
 avoid all hostile or offensive expressions concern-
 ing the United States or its Government." As a
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 panying his unsuccessful veto of the
 McCarran-Walter Act, objected strenuous-
 ly to its provisions/'
 result, the committee believed that universities
 were entitled to dismiss faculty members who
 defaulted on this "obligation."6
 Excepting essentially punitive measures aimed at
 excluding former Nazis, all subsequent immigration
 legislation barring "subversives" has focussed
 explicitly- although not exclusively- on members
 of (or on persons "affiliated with") the Communist
 party or other organizations regarded as sympa-
 thetic to its aims, and has also provided specific
 authority to exclude or deport those who "teach"
 or "advocate" its "doctrines." Additional au-
 thority has also been granted to the immigration
 service to bar any individual whose expression of
 political views is regarded as contrary to "the
 public interest." Thus, the Smith Act in 1940, the
 Displaced Persons Act in 1948, the Internal Securi-
 ty Act in 1950, and the McCarran- Walter Act in
 1952 all linked "national security" to the belief,
 expressed most directly by the Senate Judiciary
 Committee in 1950, that
 Communism is of necessity an alien force. It is in-
 conceivable that the people of the United States
 would, of their own violition [sic] organize or become
 part of a conspiracy to destroy the free institutions to
 which generations of Americans have devoted them-
 selves. The tremendous political freedom and the cor-
 ollary standard of living of the United States have
 given this country a national entity and heritage far
 superior to anything which human society has created
 elsewhere
 In the light of these facts, it is not strange that the
 vast majority of those who would establish a Com-
 munist dictatorship in this country come from alien
 lands; and it is easy to see that the forces of world
 Communism must have or find ways and means of
 getting their minions into this country.7
 The notion that Communism was a fundamental-
 ly "alien" ideology- staffed by agents who took all
 of their orders from Moscow and directed in-
 evitably toward "subversion," "world revolution,"
 and the destruction of all "democratic institutions"
 (including the universities)- was not a surprising
 view. Americans had been deeply distrustful of the
 Russian Revolution from its inception and had sup-
 ported early attempts to overthrow it militarily.
 Most had stood behind Attorney General Mitchell
 Palmer in 1919, when he used the immigration
 laws to imprison thousands of aliens (and to
 deport over 500) whom he identified as "Reds"
 about "to rise up and overthrow the Government
 at one fell swoop."8 The American people were
 well aware of the Stalinist purges in the 1930s,
 and, particularly in the era of the Berlin airlift, the
 first Soviet nuclear explosion, and the Hiss and
 Rosenberg espionage cases, could easily believe
 that the "Cold War" was a short step away from a
 "shooting war." In the interim, if the evidence
 from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and China
 could be trusted, the Soviets seemed to be gaining
 an upper hand.
 When attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the
 assignation of blame for its successes became a
 political issue in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it
 was thus not surprising that virtually all Republi-
 cans and most Democrats sought to demonstrate
 their foresight or their purity by ferreting out Com-
 munists, their overt sympathizers, and those who
 had been "duped," and therefore had failed to be
 sufficiently critical of Communist philosophy, pro-
 grams, accomplishments, or leaders. Nor was it
 surprising that the process of purgation quickly
 reached the universities.
 There it manifested itself in two ways. The
 first- and most important- involved the many in-
 stances in which university administrators, acting
  their own or in response to pressure from
 alumni, press, students, congressional or state in-
 vestigators, and organizations such as the National
 Council for American Education, threatened, cen-
 sured, or fired faculty members who refused to
 take loyalty oaths or to testify before investigating
 committees, admitted past or present Communist
 party membership or affiliation, or othe wise mani-
 fested their "disloyalty" by expressing Marxist or
 Socialist ideas or taking active roles in various
 "subversive" organizations. Fortunately for the
 academy, the firestorm of the McCarthy years
 peaked quickly and then began to subside. While it
 raged, however, the traditional defenders of
 academic freedom generally spoke with quiet
 voices- or lent at least limited support to the in-
 quisition. Thus, Sidney Hook advocated stripping
 members of the Communist party of their teaching
 positions on the grounds that all had committed
 themselves absolutely to the "Leninist line" and
 followed that line "in every area of thought from
 art to zoology."9 The Educational Policies Commis-
 sion of the National Education Association and the
 American Association of School Administrators
 made a similar recommendation and also argued
 that the "advocacy" of Communist doctrines
 should not be permitted in American schools,
 although they urged that "[y]oung citizens be
 ACADEME September-October 1987 7
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 deport alien academics and artists- that
 development had to await the Reagan ad-
 ministration/'
 given the opportunity to learn about the principles
 and practices of totalitarianism, including those
 represented by the Soviet Union and the Com-
 munist Party in the United States."10 The
 American Federation of Teachers, by official resolu-
 tion, decided not to defend faculty members
 proven to be Communists or unwilling to deny
 membership.11 The AAUP, however, expressed
 greater concern about protecting academic
 freedom. While acknowledging that under some
 circumstances Communists could be subversive of
 the educational process, it objected to firing faculty
 members who invoked the Fifth Amendment
 before official investigating committees and insisted
 that allegations or evidence of simple party
 membership did not constitute grounds for
 disciplinary action without
 evidence of unfitness to teach because of incompe-
 tence, lack of scholarly objectivity or integrity, serious
 misuse of the classroom or of academic prestige, gross
 personal misconduct, or conscious participation in con-
 spiracy against the government. The same principle
 applies, a fortiori, to alleged involvement in
 Communist-inspired activities or views, and to refusal
 to take a trustee-imposed disclaimer oath.12
 According to one critic of the academy during the
 early Cold War years, the AAUP was the only
 organization involved with higher education that
 attempted to combat political discrimination
 there.13
 The second method of guaranteeing the "purity"
 of the universities was to employ the immigration
 laws to prevent alien Communists from teaching or
 lecturing within their precincts. The AAUP, which
 called in 1952 for the immediate "removal of legis-
 lative barriers to the visits of foreign students and
 scholars to this country," was not alone in objec-
 ting to the extension and use of that law to enforce
 intellectual and political conformity. President
 Truman, in the message accompanying his unsuc-
 cessful veto of the McCarran-Walter Act, objected
 strenuously to its provisions permitting "the Attor-
 ney General to deport any alien who has engaged
 or has a purpose to engage in activities 'prejudicial
 to the public interest' or 'subversive to the national
 security.' " He noted that
 no standards or definitions are provided to guide
 discretion in the exercise of powers so sweeping. To
 punish undefined "activities" departs from traditional
 American insistence on established standards of guilt.
 To punish an undefined "purpose" is thought con-
 trol.14
 "Thought control" or not, this standardless lan-
 guage was incorporated into the McCarran-Walter
 Act, along with virtually all of the anti-"subver-
 sive" provisions adopted between 1903 and 1950.
 These provisions remain in effect today. They were
 not in fact used during the 1950s to deport alien
 academics and artists- that development had to
 await the Reagan administration. Yet many aliens
 were barred from entering the country. By 1955, it
 was estimated that "at least one hundred, and
 probably several hundred, foreign scientists had
 been denied visas" officially, and that perhaps
 three times that number had been effectively
 d nied entry through consular delaying tactics.15
 Scientists, however, were not the only targets; the
 Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz, the British novelist
 Graham Greene, and the French sociologist
 Georges Friedmann, were all early victims of the
 act, as were Joseph Krips, director of the Vienna
 State Opera, and Maurice Chevalier, the French ac-
 tor and singer.
 was the early history of the American at-
 tempt to immunize itself against "alien"
 ideas. Yet long after American universities
 had begun to ease up on domestic faculty dissi-
 dents, the United States government continued to
 use the immigration laws to insulate the nation
 from intellectual contagion. The list of those who
 have been excluded, or have faced serious immi-
 gration difficulties because of their political views,
 includes many famous names: novelists Gabriel
Garcia Marquez, Primo Levi, Carlos Fuentes,
 Alberto Moravia, and Julio Cortazar; poets Dennis
 Brutus and Mahmoud Darwish; sociologists Ernest
 Mandel and Tom Bottomore; architect Oscar
 Niemeyer; naturalist Farley Mowatt; and a variety
 of public or political figures, including Chile's
 Hortesia de Allende, Northern Ireland's Bernadette
 Devlin and Ian Paisley, El Salvador's Roberto
 D'Aubuisson.
 The list of academics excluded since 1983 also in-
 cludes Dr. Joyce deWangen-Blau, a professor at the
 Sorbonne and noted scholar of Kurdish history and
 literature, denied a visa because of "links to terror-
 ism"; Dr. Trevor Munroe, a senior lecturer at the
 University of the West Indies, denied a visa be-
 cause of his membership in a Marxist-Leninist par-
 ty in Jamaica; and two Cuban professors of phi-
 losophy, Cosme Cruz-Miranda and Arnaldo Silva-
 Leon, denied visas after being extended an invita-
 tion by the American Philosophical Association to
 8 ACADEME September-October 1987
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 address a conference on "Marxism in Cuba" on
 the grounds that it is "contrary to [American]
 foreign policy interests" to permit officials of the
 Cuban Communist Party to enter this country for
 any reason other than official diplomacy. During
 the last year, the immigration service also arrested
 Colombian journalist Patricia Lara as she arrived in
 New York to attend an academic ceremony at Co-
 lumbia University, and, after holding her in prison
 for several days, deported her without affording
 her a hearing. It justified its actions by alleging
 that she was linked secretly to a Colombian terror-
 ist organization. And Margaret Randall, a poet,
 essayist, and photographer now teaching at the
 University of New Mexico has been denied immi-
 gration benefits the government admits it other-
 wise would have granted and has been declared
 deportable on the sole ground that her work-
 which has expressed admiration of some of the
 aspects of the Vietnamese, Cuban, and Nicaraguan
 revolutions- "advocates the economic, interna-
 tional, and governmental doctrines of world com-
 munism."
 These examples, which include only some of the
 people excluded in the last thirty-five years, under-
 score a general truth: scores of foreign academics,
 creative writers and artists, and political figures
 from whom we as a society can learn much, even
 if we disagree vigorously with their politics, have
 been and continue to be directly and adversely af-
 fected by the McCarran-Walter Act. Others have
 been deterred from applying for entry either
 because of their sensible belief that their political
 views will subject them to special restrictions or ac-
 tual exclusion, or because they object to revealing
 private political views to foreign officials. For ex-
 ample, the president of the Association of Univer-
 sity Teachers, the British counterpart of the AAUP,
 declined an invitation to attend an AAUP meeting
 in the United States. He believed that present
 American screening procedures would make it dif-
 ficult, if not impossible, to obtain the required visa.
 The potency of philosophical objections was ex-
 plained by the general secretary of the Association
 of University Teachers. Writing to the AAUP about
 the effect of visa denials, he explained:
 The record of actual refusals is small, not because of
 the liberal attitude of the United States Government,
 but because many of our members, as a matter of
 principle, consider it anathema to have to attest to
 their political views and affiliations; thus, many aca-
 demics will not apply because they do not wish to
 place themselves in the position of signing declarations
 to that effect.
 More perhaps than "the record of actual refusals,"
 these words communicate the chilling effect on
 aca emic life in the United States of an immigra-
 t on law that conditions entry or residency on
 governmental certification of "acceptable" political
 attitudes.16
 issues raised by the ideological provisions
 of United States immigration law are not, of
 course, only of concern to the academy. To
 the extent that an American brand of political or-
 thodoxy is required of labor leaders, entertainers,
 bureaucrats, intending students, or any other
 foreign national, the spectre of "thought control"
 arises. Avoiding unnecessary intrusions into the
 arena of "free speech" while protecting political
 and social institutions from violent disruption is a
 responsibility that every "liberal" democracy faces.
 Since every resident of the United States will be
 more or less free- and more or less secure-
 depending on what criteria are employed to screen
 out or control unwelcome or dangerous utterances,
 it is imperative that those criteria be protective of
 the entire population, and not just particular seg-
 ments of it. Because protection is the question,
 though, actual risks have to be taken into account.
 While the legal system might reject the contention
 that those in the academy are deserving of special
 constitutional rights, it ought to conclude that the
 dangers posed by academic discourse, however
 r dical that discourse might seem, do not portend
 the violent overthrow of American institutions and
 must be accepted to preserve the overriding values
 of a liberal society.
 If immigration were not at issue, that conclusion
 would be amply supported by the First Amend-
 ment, which prohibits Congress from making any
 "law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." Although the amendment's prohibitions
 are absolute, judicial interpretation has established
 a variety of exceptions, permitting legislatures, for
 example, to pass certain types of libel laws, or cer-
 tain laws prohibiting the distribution of pornog-
 raphy, or the utterance of certain words deemed
 "obscene" on the public airwaves or unduly dis-
 ruptive when expressed in the nation's secondary
 school classrooms. But particularly when "political
 speech" is involved, a heavy presumption of con-
 stitutional protection arises. That presumption
 ACADEME September-October 1987 9
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 Those who have been ex-
 cluded, or have faced
 serious immigration dif-
 ficulties because of their
 political views include
 many famous names:
 from left, Graham
 Greene, Bernadette
 Devlin, Alberto Moravia,
 and Carlos Fuentes.
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 grows when political opinions are expressed by
 college and university faculty. For as the Supreme
 Court noted in Sweezy v. New Hampshire thirty
 years ago:
 the essentiality of freedom in the community of the
 American universities is almost self-evident. No one
 should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
 that is played by those who guide and train our
 youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellec-
 tual leaders in our colleges and universities would im-
 peril the future of our Nation .... Teachers and
 students must always be free to inquire, to study and
 to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
 otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.17
 This "freedom of responsible inquiry," as the
 Court noted in another case, is the single value
 that defines democratic discourse generally and its
 particular and specialized manifestation within the
 university. Therefore, the state must permit faculty
 and students alike "to sift evanescent doctrine"
 and "look into the meaning of social and economic
 ideas, into the checkered history of social and
 economic doctrine."18
 Not only is disinterested "inquiry" protected,
 but "advocacy" as well:
 The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
 press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe ad-
 vocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
 where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
 ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
 produce such action. . . . '[T]he mere abstract teaching
 [of] the moral propriety or even the moral necessity
 for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
 preparing a group for violent action and steeling it for
 such action/19
 In other words, the beliefs of a speaker may stand
 in opposition to the political status quo, and the
 speaker's words may indicate the "moral necessi-
ty" of overthrowing that status quo through
 violence; yet the danger posed by such advocacy is
 not sufficient to overcome the presumption in
 favor of free expression embodied in our political
 system. That presumption does not- or at least
 should not - give way when "revolutionary ideas"
 are at issue. Again, the language of Justice Black's
 earlier dissent is eloquent:
 the question ... is whether Congress has the power to
 outlaw an association, group, or party either on the
 ground that it advocates a policy of violent overthrow
 of the existing Government some time in the future or
 on the ground that it is ideologically subservient to
 some foreign country. In my view, neither of these
 factors justifies an invasion of the rights protected by
 the First Amendment. Talk about the desirability of
 revolution has a long and honorable history, not only
 in other parts of the world, but also in our own coun-
 try. This kind of talk, like any other, can be used at
 the wrong time and for the wrong purpose. But under
 our system of Government, the remedy for this danger must
 10 ACADEME September-October 1987
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 be the same remedy that is applied to the danger that comes
 from any other erroneous talk- education and contrary argu-
 ment.20 (emphasis added)
 this mode of thinking about dissent- particu-
 larly when expressed in a forum where com-
 peting views are likely to be heard- were
 applied to aliens, the consequences would be ob-
 vious. No longer would it be permissible to ex-
 clude or deport people because of their "subver-
 sive" beliefs, their "advocacy" of particular forms
 of revolutionary change, or even their membership
 in "ideologically subversive" but nonviolent
 political organizations. Instead, the government
 would be compelled to show that "dangerous"
 thoughts or speech had been accompanied by
 "dangerous" deeds- or had led directly to their ac-
 complishment. Justice Holmes' s hoary adage, "the
 most stringent protection of free speech would not
 protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and
 causing a panic," would be tested. In the absence
 of evidence of an actual panic or the virtual cer-
 tainty that one would ensue, the shouts, however
 false and misguided, would not be punished.
 Thus, Ian Paisley would no longer be excludable
 because he might preach religious hatred in North-
 ern Ireland to an audience in New York- although
 the story would be different if he brought a bomb
 with him to blow up St. Patrick's Cathedral. Sim-
 ilarly, the government, were it to insist on exclud-
 ing Professor deWangen-Blau again because of
 alleged "links with terrorism" would be required
 to answer several questions: What were those
 "links with terrorism"? Would any field research
 in politically turbulent Iran or Iraq disqualify Dr.
 deWangen-Blau from entry? Were her "links" in
 any way associated with active participation in ter-
 rorist acts abroad? Did they realistically portend
 that she would engage in, or actively incite, crimi-
 nal or terrorist acts in the United States if afforded
 entry? Similar, and perhaps more difficult, ques-
 tions would have to be answered if the govern-
 ment were again to refuse admission to Cuban
 scholars who sought only to enter for the period of
 an academic conference, and who were not iden-
 tified by the Department of State as members of a
 terrorist group. No longer would it be permissible
 to invoke "[American] foreign policy interests"
 without explaining what foreign policy interests
 would be implicated by permitting attendance at
 an academic conference, or indeed, if such in-
 terests existed, how they could conceivably out-
 weigh the clear interest that the United States has
 in being regarded by the rest of the world as an
 "open" society. As importantly, the government
 would be required to explain why such interests
 outweighed those of the American academics who
 extended the invitation to learn at first hand more
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 about Marxism in Cuba- a country to which,
 because of official action by the Reagan administra-
 tion, most American citizens and many scholars
 are effectively barred from traveling at present.
 Exclusion or deportation on ideological grounds
 in many other situations where it is currently per-
 mitted no longer would be possible, no matter
 what questions were asked. Thus attendance at a
 Moscow peace conference twenty-five years ago -
 Dr. Jim Harding's "offense"- or poems praising
 "Fidel" or "Che"- one of Margaret Randall's
 alleged peccadillos- would simply have no legal
 relevance.
 Unfortunately for alien academics and their
 American faculty sponsors, the Supreme Court has
 not been willing to admit noncitizens fully into the
 "marketplace of ideas." While acknowledging that
 American faculty members have a constitutionally
 protected right to "receive information" from
 foreign scholars, it has refused to give that "right"
 any substance. Instead, as the law presently
 stands, "plenary congressional power to make pol-
 icies and rules for the exclusion of aliens" has
 been reaffirmed, and any "facially legitimate and
 bona fide reason" offered by the government for
 keeping unwanted aliens out will suffice. Even if
 the reason offered by the executive or Congress for
 excluding an alien is the likelihood that he or she
 will present an unorthodox Marxist economic
 theory to a scholarly conference, that reason will
 not be tested "by balancing [it] against the First
 Amendment rights of those who seek personal
 communication with the alien."21 The constitu-
 tional situation is considerably more murky for
 aliens like Margaret Randall, who face "deporta-
 tion" from the United States rather than initial ex-
 clusion.22 Yet the provision of the McCarran- Walter
Act that permits her deportation because of her
 "advocacy" and "beliefs" has thus far withstood
 challenge in the lower federal courts.
 Legislation of the sort currently proposed is
 therefore necessary if the bearers of "alien ideas"
 are to be accorded a genuine welcome. In 1977,
 Congress passed the "McGovern Amendment."
 That statute obligates the secretary of state to ad-
 mit any alien excludable by virtue of simple mem-
 12 ACADEME September-October 1987
 A National Embarrassment
 STENY H. HOYER
 Perhaps the greatest tribute Congress could pay to the Con-
 stitution this bicentennial year is to cleanse our statute books of
 laws that mock our freedoms. One such law is the McCarran-
 Walter Act of 1952, a legal relic of McCarthyism that has somehow
 remained on the books despite its affront to free speech at home
 and the embarrassment it causes us abroad. . . .
 Such a law seems surprising in this free land of ours. It is a
 basic premise of our system that the best defense against a bad
 idea is a good idea - not a censored idea. Making policy in a
 democracy requires an infusion of perspectives from all sources,
 whether we like what they have to say or not.
 McCarran-Walter, however, puts government in the business
 of selecting which speakers and opinions are appropriate for an
 American audience. While we like to think of our society as a free
 market for ideas, the McCarran-Walter Act serves as ideological
 protectionism. It is censorship by any other name. . . .
 It is a further irony that whatever questionable foreign policy
 gains we might make by excluding visitors under this law are
 undermined by the foreign policy losses because of it. McCarran-
 Walter is viewed as a violation of our Helsinki commitments on
 travel, movement, human contacts and the free flow of informa-
 tion. Though a trifle compared with Soviet and East European
 Helsinki violations, it gives those nations a convenient way to
 defuse our criticism of their massive human rights abuses.
 When we raise the pr blem o  Soviet emigration restrictions,
 they divert the discussion to McCarran-Walter and say that it
 discrimina es gainst communist nations. When we went to
 Ottawa in 1985 for the Human Rights Experts Meeting, we were
 forced to explain why Canadian author Farley Mowat had just
 been excluded from the United States. We faced the same un-
 necessary questions at last year's Human Contacts Meeting in
Bern and at the ongoing Helsinki Review Meeting in Vienna. The
 McCarran-Walter Act has become a needless diplomatic
 distraction.
 A bill now pending in the House, sponsored by Rep. Barney
 Frank, would repeal the ideological exclusion provisions of the
 McCarran-Walter Act by prohibiting the government from barring
 entry on the basis of ideology or affiliation. At the same time it
 would address national security concerns by toughening restric-
 tions on terrorists and excluding anyone expected to commit a
 criminal act that could endanger our national security.
 In this year of the Constitution, it is time to restore our visa
 laws to their proper foundation, the Bill of Rights.
 Representative Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland is chair of the Commission
 on Security and Cooperation in Europe. © Washington Post, September
 2, 1987. Reprinted by permission.
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 "An elaborate and standardless statute, in-
 herited from the McCarthy era, still -per-
 mits the government to exercise broad
 discretion. "
 bership in the Communist party unless he "deter-
 mines that admission of such alien would be con-
 trary to the security interests of the United
 States." Nothing really limits his power to make
 that determination, however, nor does the
 McGovern amendment protect those excluded
 because of their ideas rather than their affiliations.
 Indeed, an elaborate and standardless statute, in-
 herited from the McCarthy era, still permits the
 government to exercise broad discretion in impos-
 ing barriers against those with unorthodox or
 threatening views.
 "marketplace of ideas," whether regarded
 as the basis of democratic government or the
 principle upon which universities are built, is
 always an ideal. Nowhere is it to be found in a
 pure form. Always, the persuasive and powerful
 will skew the public debate in the direction they
 favor, withholding information and misstating facts
 to gain political advantage. Even in the univer-
 sities, the model of open discourse and informed
 choice is in part a myth. The goal of academic
 freedom is something which always exists within
 the context of current academic disciplines and
 popular modes of thought and is always to some
 extent constrained by prevailing orthodoxies. Those
 orthodoxies are not entirely self-contained; inevit-
 ably, institutions of higher education will respond
 to the web of influences that tie them to the wider
 world. During the McCarthy era, the coercive con-
 sensus on the Cold War and the "Communist
 Menace" which defined much of the political uni-
 verse also exerted great influence on the nation's
 universities, substantially limiting the range of ac-
 ceptable debate. As Ellen Schrecker has noted:
 "Patriotism, not expedience, sustained the
 academic community's willingness to collaborate
 with McCarthyism. The intellectual independence
 so prized by American academics simply did not
 extend to the United States government."23
 It is naive to think that the goal of true inde-
 pendence will ever be totally realized, that the
 bonds of hegemony will ever be totally shaken
 loose. Yet the academy is obligated to make the at-
 tempt. It must strive to become the open forum it
 has always professed to be, the agora in which no
 ideas are "alien," the institution where ordered
 discourse thrives, and the order of that discourse
 encourages questioning and contradiction. The
 present debate about immigration strictures affords
 an opportunity to renew that commitment.
 NOTES
 1. The legislative history given here and in the following
 paragraphs is based primarily on E.P. Hutchinson, Legislative
 History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965 (Philadelphia:
 University of Pennsylvania, 1981) and T.A. Alienikoff and D.
 Martin, Immigration Process and Policy (St. Paul, Minnesota: West
 Publishing Co., 1985).
 2. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
 Control Board, cited in United States Reports, vol. 367, p. 5, at pp.
 155-56.
 3. Act of June 5, 1920, cited in Alienikoff and Martin, p. 352.
 4. The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New
 York: Columbia U. Press 1955), p. 499.
 5. Ibid., pp. 502-03.
 6. "Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in War-
 time/' AAUP Bulletin 4 (February-March 1918): 30.
 7. S. Rept. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), p. 782.
 8. See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
 Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers U. Press 1955),
 pp. 229-31; Alienikoff and Martin, pp. 352-55.
 9. Sidney Hook, "Should Communists Be Permitted to
 Teach?," NYT Magazine, 27 Feb. 1949, p. 24; quoted in B. W.
 Patch, "Academic Freedom," Editorial Research Reports (July
 1949): 436.
 10. Patch, pp. 434-35. In other words, students should be per-
 mitted to read Sidney Hook commenting on Herbert Marcuse,
 but not Herbert Marcuse commenting on Sidney Hook.
 11. David Caute, The Great Fear (New York: Simon and
 Schuster, 1978), p. 406.
 12. AAUP, "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for
 National Security," Bulletin of the AAUP, 42 (Spring 1956): 58.
 13. Caute, p. 406. For the view that the AAUP did not throw
 itself wholeheartedly into that attempt, see Ellen Schrecker, No
 Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York and
 London: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 14. Immigration Bill Veto, Congressional Record Qiine 25, 1952), p.
 8228.
 15. Caute, p. 256, citing E. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (London:
 Heinemann, 1956), p. 187.
 16. Occasionally, the effect can extend beyond the nation's
 borders. For instance, Canadian Professor Jim Harding, after in-
 itially being barred from entry, was eventually given permission
 to enter the United States briefly in order to make airline con-
 nections to Central America, where he planned to spend his
 sabbatical researching the current political situation. But the
 INS, despite his vigorous denials of past or present Communist
 party membership, placed a stamp in his passport identifying
 him as a member of the Communist party who had been
 granted a special immigration "waiver." Faced with the hostili-
 ty and danger that such "official" identification posed in that
 war-torn and ideologically volatile region, Harding cancelled his
 trip.
 17. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
 18. Wiema in v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter,
 I., concurring).
 19. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1962); Noto v.
 United States. 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
 20. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
 Control Board. 347 U.S. at 147-148.
 21. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
 22. Whether such aliens are in fact protected by the First
 Amendment, and may invoke its terms when contesting depor-
 tation, is a puzzling question that has generated inconsistent
 and impenetrable rulings from the Supreme Court. Compare
 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); 326 U.S. 135 (1945);
 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); and Galvan v.
 Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). Litigation in the Randall case may
 eventually yield some clearer answers.
 23. No Ivory Tower, p. 340.
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